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Ten Lessons Learned
about Host-Nation
Construction in
Afghanistan
Vikram Mittal, PhD

T

he 26th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade
robotics, with my only civil engineering training being in
notified me in January 2011 that I was to serve
the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC). So, like any
as a design engineer for our bases in Kabul,
good soldier, I learned, adapted, and overcame.
Afghanistan. That
Over the course of the
year, Money as a
year, I learned a lot about
Weapon System–
Afghan construction.
Afghanistan
The following ten lessons
(MAAWS-A)
proved invaluable to me
was in full effect,
and could likewise prove
and U.S. Army
useful for others overseevertical engineers
ing construction operawere in short
tions in Afghanistan.
supply.1 Therefore,
Lesson 1—The
the Army relied
Process for New
heavily on Afghan
Construction Was
companies for
Straightforward
new construcAn Afghan contractor poses for a photo while assisting with the removal of
but Took Time
tion. During the
blast-resistant concrete barriers 6 November 2013 at Multinational Base Tirin
The process for approvdeployment, I was
Kot, Afghanistan. Civilian contractors assisted U.S. and Australian troops with the
ing new construction in
responsible for
drawdown of the base and the transfer of the remaining facilities to the Afghan
National Security Forces. (Photo by Cpl. Mark Doran, Australian Defense Force)
Afghanistan was similar
designing this new
to that in the United
construction in
States. The process began with a commander submitting
the Kabul Base Cluster, projects totaling $170 million.
a request for new construction. This was followed by a
My responsibilities expanded midway through the tour
site survey and a design for the construction project. The
when I assumed the additional role of overseeing all
project proposal went before a Joint Facilities Utilization
construction operations in the region.
Board, where a general officer, who had approval authorHaving no prior experience as a civil engineer, these
ity for projects under $750,000, could approve it.2 The
jobs were well above my expertise. Prior to deployment,
money was allocated after the project was approved.
my engineering experience focused on vehicles and
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Afghan contractors reinforce the roof of a school under construction 19 January 2012 in Garmsir District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan.
Twelve permanent schools were under construction by Afghan contractors in the Garmsir District. A civil affairs team in support of the 3rd
Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, visited several of the sites to inspect the structures and ensure compliance with the quality assurance standards
of the Afghan government. (Photo by Cpl. Reece Lodder, U.S. Marine Corps)

While the money was being procured, a complete set
of engineering drawings and a statement of work (SOW)
were completed. Those documents became available to
Afghan construction companies so they could bid on
projects. Interested companies could submit a technical proposal and a bid. We then reviewed the technical
proposals. (These were often just reiterations of the SOW
for technical feasibility.) Subsequently, the contract was
awarded to the company with the most technically feasible
proposal and the lowest cost.
Following the award of a contract, there would be a
kick-off meeting with the Afghan companies at which
time we would go through the SOW, answer any questions, and reiterate key deadlines. A contract officer representative would be assigned for each project with instructions to contact us with any technical issues that arose
between inspections. The project would then begin, with
a typical period of performance of ninety days, although
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they typically ran thirty to sixty days over. Over the course
of the project, we would have monthly job-site inspections
to check progress and adherence to the SOW.
When a project was completed, it would undergo
a final inspection, and projects that were on a major
base required an additional inspection by the Logistics
Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). LOGCAP
is a program where an American company contracts
logistics support for the military. The LOGCAP included companies such as KBR, DynCorp, and Fluor.3
In my region, Fluor had the LOGCAP contract. Fluor
representatives would inspect the new construction, and,
upon a successful inspection, they would take ownership
of the upkeep and maintenance of the building.
Expedited projects could go through this entire
process in four to six months; however, most projects
would take six to eight months. Due to the length of
the process, which often overlapped unit deployments,
95

the majority of our construction was designed by our
predecessors. Similarly, the majority of our designs were
built by our successors.

Lesson 2—Afghan Companies Often
Would Mislead You to Get a Contract

For example, we were constructing a two-story barracks
building that required a staircase. However, though
the drawings included the staircase, the SOW failed to
specifically mention it. In response, the Afghan company demanded an additional $100,000 for the staircase.
Although we could have had another company construct
it for a fraction of the
cost, we would have
needed to start a new
construction process,
and the barracks
would have been
uninhabitable for
another six months.
So we determined
that it was more cost
effective to pay the
additional cost in
the interest of time
to meet the mission.
The lesson is to
ensure the SOW is
precise not only for
the sake of intrinsic
accuracy but also to
avoid the necessity of
caviling with greedy
Afghan contractors
who demand outrageous sums to rectify
ostensible planning
oversights.

Afghanistan has
been in turmoil since
the Russian invasion
in 1979. With the
high level of danger associated with
living in an active war
zone, many Afghans
have developed a
Darwinian survivalist
mentality and a keen
sense of opportunism, especially about
competing for money,
which is viewed as the
key for survival. This
ruthlessly competitive
impulse was whetted
with the appearance
of the U.S. Army,
which had a substantial amount of money
that it was clearly
anxious to spend on
new construction.
Not surprisingly, in
Afghan contractors help Afghan National Army soldiers build a latrine 7 February
the ensuing scramble
2013 near Takir, Afghanistan. (Photo by 1st Lt. Gerrelaine Alcordo, U.S. Army)
Lesson 3—
for money, Afghan
Ownership of
companies desiring to
“Afghan” Construction Companies
secure construction contracts often provided misleading
Was Often Obscure and Dubious
technical proposals and bids. For example, Afghan comOpportunism was not exclusive to Afghans. A major
panies would claim that they possessed capabilities they
collateral intent of MAAWS-A was to put money into
did not have. Similarly, Afghan companies would agree
the Afghan economy, but some of the construction
to schedules that they had no ability to meet.
companies were not owned by Afghans. Although upMoreover, as a money-bilking strategy, Afghan
per-class Afghan citizens owned the bulk of the compacompanies would habitually belabor the cost of any
nies, several were owned by American expatriates who
modifications that were made in our designs. Although
had previously been in Afghanistan as contractors or as
our designs went through significant scrutiny, due to the
sheer volume of new construction and the short timelines part of the military. Such expatriates apparently saw the
large amount of money that the Army was willing to
in which such construction was expected to be completpay for projects and the low cost of labor. Consequently,
ed, it was difficult to catch all the planning oversights.
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Navy Lt. Stephen Gustafson, Khost Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) engineer, teaches proper masonry supply storage to local engineers,
construction contractors, and foremen during a monthly contractor training session on 14 November 2009 at the Civil Military Operations
Center in Khost, Afghanistan. Engineers from the Khost PRT provided construction quality-assurance training to locals to facilitate high-quality
construction practices in the region. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Stephen J. Otero, U.S. Air Force)

among such, the bulk of the money that was intended to
infuse the Afghan economy no doubt ended up infusing
personal economies elsewhere.
For example, during one preconstruction meeting,
the owner of one Afghan company arrived; he was a tall
American with a common access card (CAC) that indicated he was a GS-15–level U.S. government employee.
I had our base security investigate him and found that
his CAC had been issued the previous year when he was
working for the U.S. government.
During another job-site inspection, I met with a
dubious owner of another company. Although Afghan,
he had been a refugee who grew up in England, received a master’s degree in engineering from Oxford
Brookes University, and returned to Afghanistan to
take over the family construction company. Former
Afghan refugees owned a number of construction
companies; although the majority had been refugees
in Pakistan, several had returned to Afghanistan from
MILITARY REVIEW
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Europe and North America, attracted by the potential of earning lucrative windfall profits from the U.S.
Army construction program.
Among all such companies, even those owned
by local Afghans, there appeared to be a pervasive
degree of corruption at some level. For example, in
one bidding process, we discovered that multiple
construction companies were owned by a single
individual and that these companies were submitting
competing bids for projects during a process that
attempted to hide their true ownership. Later, this set
of companies was blacklisted when it was discovered
that the owner had close ties to the Taliban.
However, it is worth noting that the corruption we
found in the ownership of Afghan companies did not
extend to Afghan labor. Afghan laborers were typically
paid $5 per day. These personnel were working to provide the minimum necessities for their families, and $5
per day was adequate to feed a family.
97

Lesson 4—Afghan Lifestyle Meant
Timelines Had to Be Flexible
Our mobilization training had prepared us for the
term inshallah (God willing) and the fatalistic concept
implied by it. The Afghans would often use this term to
describe failure to meet work timelines, especially when
they had little intent on meeting them. In response,
we would typically be compelled to add 50 percent
contingency time onto the end of project timelines to
mitigate the Afghan inability to stick to an Americanstyle construction schedule.
However, another unexpected issue arose from the
final LOGCAP inspections of projects. Fluor would
often reject the electrical or plumbing work, and would
then ask for substantial amounts of money to fix it.
Though paying Fluor to resolve the issues would have
been much more expedient, we legally had to return to
the Afghan companies as part of their original contract. We would then be forced to watch over the work
to ensure that all corrections were properly made. It
would typically take two to four months from the project-completion date before the construction was fully
complete and the facility was ready for use.
Another large problem with keeping on project
schedules was caused by Ramadan. The construction
schedules submitted by companies routinely did not
account for work slowdown during the Muslim holy
month resulting from the religious obligation for workers to abstain from food and water throughout daylight
hours extending from sunrise to nightfall. Though
Ramadan was a significant societal event with practical
impact on the lifestyle of most Afghans, management
would not put projects on hold, and construction
crews were still expected to work during Ramadan. A
common result was that, due to fasting, crews would
be so exhausted from the heat that, by midday, they
would attempt to escape the sun, and the majority of
physically demanding labor would come to a halt. As
a result, the construction timelines would have to be
pushed into the night after crews had broken their day’s
fast after sunset.

Lesson 5—The Bulk of the
Construction Material Came
from Russia
The civil engineering courses that I attended during BOLC taught reliance on American
98

construction materials (e.g., lumber and I-beams).
However, similarly graded materials up to American
standards were often difficult for Afghan companies
to secure domestically since Afghanistan did not have
the natural resources or production infrastructure to
manufacture them. Therefore, most of the construction materials were imported from Russia, and the
cost of importing those materials drove up the price
for projects. For example, standard pressure-treated
Russian lumber was five times more expensive than
U.S. lumber, and many sizes were not available.
Despite the seeming challenge of acquiring suitable substitutes for American-grade building materials, Afghan construction companies nevertheless
still insisted that they could get any of the requested
materials. For example, we had a project that required
I-beams, and my original design called for American
standard I-beams that were calculated from Field
Manual 3-34.40, General Engineering.4 We included a
similar Russian I-beam that would be more readily
available in Afghanistan, but the Afghan construction
company insisted that they had American I-beams.
However, upon starting construction, we observed
that the contractors were welding sheets of metal
to replicate I-beams in form. These ad hoc I-beams
clearly did not have the adequate structural properties
required for the heavy construction contemplated.
Notwithstanding, the owner of the Afghan company
proceeded to vehemently argue that the welded sheets
were, in fact, I-beams delivered from the United States.
A key lesson is the necessity to closely monitor
the construction materials employed by Afghan
companies since these companies often attempt to
substitute substandard materials for those stipulated
in the contract.

Lesson 6—Afghans Have Experience
with Concrete but Typically of
Dubious Quality
The Afghans have used concrete for construction for centuries so they have experience with it.
However, their standards for mixing concrete were
significantly less stringent than what we required and
designed for, as our designs would call for 4,000-psi
reinforced concrete. Unfortunately, it was our experience that we were often given falsified test reports
that stated that the concrete was 4,000-psi when it
September-October 2016
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Mohammed Mohsin, a deputy provincial manager with the Central Asia Development Group, discusses a construction project with Lt. Col.
Joseph Cetta, 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team and Combined Task Force Arrowhead, and Trisha Bury, a field program officer with the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), on 23 July 2012 outside the district center at Spin Boldak, Afghanistan. The project is part of
an effort by USAID and the Afghan government to keep military-aged males and at-risk populations employed in programs that will improve
the community. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Brendan Mackie, U.S. Army)

came time to pour, but would then fail the slump test
that we gave it to verify the test report.5
The consequences of using poorly mixed concrete
were everywhere. For example, as part of a humanitarian project, a well was built in one of the villages
on the outskirts of Kabul. When I inspected the well,
parts of the concrete broke off in my hand. Clearly
visible in the mix were twigs and debris from the
ground. Upon further analysis, it appeared that the
contractor had used loose soil instead of sand in the
concrete blend.
The issue of substandard concrete arose in large
measure because Afghan construction companies typically preferred hand-mixing concrete. Hand-mixing
involves dumping sand, rocks, cement, and water onto
the ground and mixing it with shovels. The resulting
concrete often failed to meet the basic standards for
MILITARY REVIEW
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concrete. In one instance, we tested out a sample of
hand-mixed concrete and it readily fractured at pressures well below that of 4,000-psi concrete, not even
exceeding the standard for 1,000-psi concrete.

Lesson 7—Afghan Carpentry Had to
Be Closely Monitored
The standard Army building on semipermanent
bases is the barracks hut (B-hut), which is a twenty-by-forty-foot wooden structure. My base, Camp
Phoenix, had roughly eighty B-huts. Army engineers
built some of these B-huts, and Afghan construction
companies built some as well. Those constructed by
the Afghans were not outwardly distinguishable from
those made by the Army engineers.
However, two issues arose from the use of wooden
structures. First, the lumber was at a premium and
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was typically imported from Russia. As such, the selection was limited and expensive. Second, though the
outer surfaces of the wooden structures were painted in an attempt to help prevent deterioration from
weather, the Afghan carpenters had used gasoline instead of turpentine or other more suitable additive to
dilute the paint, and the gasoline had impregnated the
wood. As a result, during the dry, windy season, the
B-huts were prone to catching fire. Not surprisingly,
our brigade commander did not allow his soldiers to
stay in those B-huts due to the fire risk.

Lesson 8—Afghan Electrical Work
Did Not Meet American Standards
The Afghans had few electricians trained to U.S.
electrical standards. However, the Afghan companies would never admit they did not have adequately
trained electricians because our SOWs required them.
On the contrary, the technical proposals from construction companies would routinely indicate they
had a licensed electrician that met the SOW requirement. However, from evaluating hundreds of technical
proposals, we discovered that every company claimed
the same three licensed electricians. As it turned out,
these electricians were American expatriates who were
presumably in very high demand. But, notwithstanding their assured presence in the proposals approved,
over the course of the year, we never saw any of these
electricians on any of our job sites.
Additionally, the quality of electrical supplies
Afghan companies attempted to use was a major issue—
many of the electrical components were fake. We found
wires that had the wrong gauges and certifications
stamped on them. Additionally, though our SOWs required that our electrical panels be “UL/CE approved,”
more often than not, Afghan companies would attempt
to pass off counterfeit panel boxes merely by affixing
“UL/CE approved” stickers to them.6
To mitigate these problems, we were able to provide
significant oversight on the electrical work since our
National Guard team included a signal noncommissioned officer who was a civilian master electrician. He
would go through initial inspections, help the Afghans,
and perform general quality control. Due to the ubiquitous attempts by Afghan companies at deceit and fraud
associated with electrical work, over the course of the
year, he was one of the busiest men in Kabul.
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Lesson 9—Afghan Plumbing Work
Did Not Meet American Standards
The Afghans’ ability to do plumbing was on par with
their ability to do electrical work. Similar to the poor
quality of their electrical work, plumbing was characterized by leaks caused by mismatched fittings, bad welds,
and poor seals. Additionally, Afghan contractors would
use imported counterfeit parts from Russia when they
thought they could get away with it.
One of our larger projects was construction of four
two-story barracks with a latrine on each floor. Each
floor could house a hundred and twenty soldiers. The
projects were expected to be completed by mid-2009.
However, the plumbing had to be reinstalled twice, both
times due to a large number of leaks in the pipes. Not
surprisingly, these were caused by mismatched fittings,
bad welds, and poor seals.
We also had issues with latrine-shower-sink (LSS)
units. These were eight-by-twenty-foot shipping containers converted into latrines with showers, toilets,
and sinks. However, while the majority of Afghans
were not familiar with Western plumbing, the issue
with the units was more than that. Though our initial
inclination was to blame the contractors, a real contributing problem was that our SOWs and drawings were
incomplete. In the end, the issue was largely resolved by
updating the documents.

Lesson 10—Safety Standards Are
Fairly Lax on Afghan Job Sites
Our SOW mandated that the construction sites
were Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) compliant. However, although we had no safety
incidents for the entire year, the construction sites were
far from compliant. The Afghans loathed personal protective equipment and never wore hearing or eye protection, even while welding or operating heavy equipment.
They were expected to wear hard hats, and they would
bring them to job sites, but they would never wear them.
At one point, we saw them using their hard hats as mixing bowls for concrete. Additionally, the Afghan labor
would walk up and down the ladders backwards, even
on icy days, and they would stand on top of fifteen-foot
Texas barriers as the cranes were moving them.
It is hard to know what lesson one derives from such
a situation other than to try to be understanding and
supportive within the cultural context one is confronted.
September-October 2016
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Conclusion
Although the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan
has decreased, Afghan companies will continue to
perform the majority of new construction required on
our bases. Awareness of the ten lessons discussed above
gleaned from personal experience and observations are
intended to help any soldier placed in charge of designing or overseeing Afghan construction prepare for the
challenge. I suggest that the major overall lessons are that
the Afghan companies hired to perform the work require

close monitoring and significant oversight, and that we
appreciate the necessity of operating with a reasonable
expectation that there will be cost and schedule overruns.
Though the situation described above might seem at
first depressing, it is important to note that the structures
we constructed were eventually built to standard, and the
construction missions were successfully accomplished.
For a war that had been going on for fifteen years and
cost $5 trillion, our schedule and cost overruns to complete them seemed trivial.
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